The Stimson Doctrine
- Henry Stimson reacted to Japanese actions in Manchuria
- Would not allow for territorial changes to China
- Comes under US sphere of influence
- A reason Japan walked out of the League of Nations
Summary
From late 1931 until the end of his term in 1933, the administration of President Herbert Hoover attempted to deal with a worsening Manchurian problem. Mired down in the worst depression yet faced by the United States and committed to moral suasion rather than military action, Hoover found his options in the Far East greatly limited. By nature he shrank from the possible use of force against Japan, preferring some other resolution of the increasingly difficult issue. The nation was militarily unprepared for war in Asia, and Hoover recognized that a bellicose posture might provide the spark for Japanese action far beyond the limited area of Manchuria. This was the age of disillusionment with World War I and Americans were not inclined to resort to force in a region so remote and apparently so unimportant. Already criticized for having curtailed American overseas commerce by signing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, Hoover was unwilling to further dampen foreign trade by imposing an embargo on Japan.Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, more anxious than Hoover to take a firm stand on Manchuria, made one last effort to apply the moral suasion concept that had dominated Republican foreign policy in the 1920s. On January 7, 1932, he sent notes to both China and Japan announcing what has come to be known as the Stimson Doctrine, a policy of nonrecognition of changes brought about in violation of the Kellogg Pact.